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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20000756-CA 
v. : 
STEVEN R. PERRY, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and sentence entered on unconditional guilty pleas 
to possession of a controlled substance with the intent to engage in a clandestine lab 
operation, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4(e) & 58-
37d-5(g) (1998), and possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (Supp. 2000) (in Add. A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This Court must first decide if defendant waived his claim that his trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance where he did not condition either of his pleas on that 
claim. Absent waiver, did trial counsel render ineffective assistance when he arranged for 
substitute counsel to appear on his behalf while he was out of the country in order to 
ensure that the matter was continued until he could return? 
Where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on 
appeal, this Court decides the issue as a matter of law. State v. Maestas. 1999 UT 32, f 
20, 984 P.2d 376; State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). However, "[w]here the 
record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom 
simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." State 
v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ [17, 12 P.3d 92 (noting "the general rule that record 
inadequacies result in an assumption of regularity on appeal") (citing State v. Robertson, 
932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are relevant to the issue on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance precursor with 
intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4(3) and 58-37d-5(g) (1998); possession of a controlled 
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substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (Supp. 
2000); and possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2000) (R. 3-5). Defendant hired Russell T. Doncouse to represent 
him(R. 13-14). Thereafter, the following occurred: 
Hearing 
Date Appearance 
1) 8/25/99 Defendant and 
Doncouse absent 
2) 9/8/99 Doncouse present 
3) 10/6/99 Doncouse absent 
until mid-November-
out of the country 
4) 11/10/99 Doncouse absent 
until January 2000 
5) 12/22/99 Defendant absent. 
Doncouse absent 
until 1/19/00 
6) 1/10/00 Doncouse absent 
until 1/19/00 
Substance 
Arraignment. Continued by previous phone call 
from Mr. Doncouse due to scheduling conflict 
(R. 18-19). Defendant is not incarcerated. 
Arraignment. Preliminary hearing requested 
and set (R. 22-23). 
Preliminary hearing. Preliminary hearing 
waived; speedy trial waived to pursue plea 
negotiations; matter continued one month (R. 
83:10/6/99:1-3). 
Status hearing. Negotiations not complete; trial 
and pre-trial setting requested for after Mr. 
Doncouse returns to town so that he can handle 
the negotiations; trial is set for January 27 and 
28 (R. 83:Tab2:l-3). 
Hearing on defendant's motion to continue. 
Matter continued to permit notification to 
defendant to appear to waive speedy trial right 
(R. 36;83:Tab3:l-6). 
Hearing on defendant's motion to continue. 
Defendant waives speedy trial right; trial re-set 
to March 6 and 7 due to Mr. Doncouse's 
unavailability to handle the plea negotiations (R. 
83:Tab4:l-3). 
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7) 2/23/00 Doncouse absent 
due to illness 
8) 3/1/00 Doncouse absent 
due to scheduling 
conflict 
9) 4/19/00 Doncouse present 
10) 4/26/00 Doncouse present 
11) 6/28/00 Doncouse absent-
Out of the country 
12)7/19/00 
13) 8/2/00 
Pre-trial conference. A plea offer has been 
made; defendant and Mr. Doncouse have not yet 
met about the offer; defendant requests a one-
week continuance, which requires that the trial 
date be stricken; defendant waives his speedy 
trial right; trial date is stricken and status 
hearing scheduled (R. 83:Tab5:l-3). 
Change of plea hearing. Negotiations are 
complete and defendant enters guilty pleas to 
a second and a third degree felony; a 
misdemeanor drug charge is dismissed; a 
presentence investigation report is ordered (R. 
82:3/1/00:2-9). 
Sentencing. Defendant requests one week 
continuance due to the fact that Mr. Doncouse 
received the presentence investigation report 
within the previous 24 hours and needs more 
time to prepare (R. 48-49). 
Sentencing. Both parties present argument, and 
the court orders a 60-day diagnostic evaluation 
at the prison (R. 50-51; 82:4/26/00:3-23). 
Defendant is incarcerated at the conclusion of 
the hearing (R. 82:4/26/00:20-23). 
Sentencing. Defendant "unexpectedly]" 
questions the adequacy of Mr. Doncouse's 
representation and seeks a continuance to hire 
new counsel (R. 82:6/28/00:2-5). 
New counsel appears and seeks a two-week 
continuance to review the case; granted (R. 
82:7/19/00:2-3). 
Sentencing. The parties present statements and 
the court sentences defendant to an 
indeterminate prison term of one-to-fifteen 
years for the second degree felony, and no more 
4 
than five years for the third degree felony, to 
run concurrently (R. 62-63; R. 82:8/2/00;17-19). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Acting pursuant to a tip that defendant had purchased a large amount of either red 
phosphorous or iodine and was manufacturing methamphetamine, officers obtained and 
executed a search warrant for defendant's home on June 15, 1999 (R. 82:3/1/00:5-6). 
They found phosphorous, pseudoephedrine, and iodine in the home, all necessary 
ingredients for manufacturing methamphetamine (R. 82:3/1/00:6). They also found 
"finished" methamphetamine and marijuana, together with "a variety of pieces of lab" 
(id.). Everything was consistent with manufacturing methamphetamine (id.). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims his trial counsel was ineffective because he sent substitute 
counsel to appear in court numerous times on defendant's behalf while counsel himself 
was out of town. However, defendant waived this non-jurisdictional claim of a pre-plea 
constitutional violation when he entered his voluntary guilty pleas without making them 
conditional on the preservation of this issue. Even if defendant's claim were properly 
before the Court, it fails because it rests on a flawed premise, it is without record support, 
and defendant fails to allege the requisite prejudice. To the extent there is any record 
evidence related to the issue, it is contrary to defendant's claim. 
lThe facts are taken from the prosecutor's uncontested recitation at the change of 
plea hearing on March 1, 2000 (R. 82:3/1/00:5-7). 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL WAS WAIVED BY ENTRY OF HIS UNCONDITIONAL 
GUILTY PLEAS; FURTHER, IT FAILS BECAUSE DEFENDANT 
HAS NEITHER PROVIDED ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR THE 
CLAIM NOR ESTABLISHED PREJUDICE 
Defendant contends that his chosen counsel rendered ineffective assistance below 
by appearing in court for only one often hearings before defendant hired new counsel. 
Br. of Aplt. at 7-11. Defendant argues that this left him at the mercy of substitute 
counsel, without his consent, who knew little or nothing about the facts of the case or the 
relevant law and who made no attempt to "properly" discuss the case before appearing in 
court. Id at 7, 9-11. This also allegedly prevented defendant from consulting with or 
being advised by his counsel at any stage of the proceedings, leaving him without an 
understanding of the charges against him, the relevant law, or the State's burden of proof. 
Id. Finally, defendant notes, without argument, that his counsel promised him a sentence 
of probation and drug counseling. Id. at 10. 
Defendant waived this claim of ineffectiveness when he entered his guilty pleas 
without conditioning them on the right to challenge the effectiveness of his counsel's 
performance. Further, the record is insufficient to support defendant's claims, which are 
made for the first time on direct appeal. Moreover, those parts of the record having any 
bearing on the issue are contrary to defendant's assertions. Finally, defendant received 
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what he wanted and what the numerous hearings were designed to achieve—his counsel's 
involvement in negotiations and in resolving the case on defendant's behalf. 
A. Defendant Waived His Claim. 
As a general rule, "a voluntary [and unconditional] guilty plea is a waiver of 
the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues, including pre-plea constitutional violations." 
State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 567 n.l (Utah App. 1994); see also State v. Parsons, 781 
P.2d 1275,1278 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994); State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 
1157, 1164 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah App. 1994); 
State v. Smith, 833 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah App. 1992); State ex rel. E.G.T., 808 P.2d 138, 
138-39 (Utah App. 1991) (per curiam); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935,938 (Utah App. 1988). 
Once a defendant has admitted his factual guilt by pleading guilty,"' [h]e may only attack the 
voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea.'" Parsons, 781 P.2dat 1277-78 (quoting 
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973)). 
An exception to this general rule exists when the plea entered by the defendant, with 
the consent of the prosecution and accepted by the trial court, specifically preserves an issue 
for appeal and allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant prevails on appeal. See Serv, 758 
P.2d at 938-39; State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App. 1990): see also Smith, 833 
P.2d at 372. 
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Here, defendant's pleas were unconditional (R. 135:79-86). He does not challenge 
the validity of his pleas, that is, their knowing and voluntary character.2 He complains only 
that he was denied a nonjurisdictional constitutional right to effective assistance of trial 
counsel before and during entrance of his pleas. Accordingly, defendant waived his claim 
that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by entering voluntary guilty pleas that 
were not conditioned on the right to appeal the issue. 
B. Because Defendant's Argument Rests on a Flawed Premise, He Failed to Develop 
an Adequate Record to Support His Claim, and He Fails to Allege Prejudice, this 
Court Should Presume that Counsel's Conduct was Within the Wide Range of 
Reasonable Professional Assistance 
Even if defendant's claim was properly before the Court, it would fail. Defendant 
raises his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the first time on appeal through 
new counsel. To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant has the burden 
of demonstrating "that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19, 12 
P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 
(1984)). Defendant must then demonstrate "that counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." IcL (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687-88). Where a defendant fails to establish either prong of the test, this Court need look 
no further and may reject a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Huggins, 
2See note 3, infra. 
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920 P.2d 1195,1199 (Utah App.) (for each of two claims of ineffectiveness, the court refuses 
to reach one prong of the test where defendant fails to establish the other prong), cert denied. 
929 P.2d 350 (Utah 1996); State v. PascuaL 804 P.2d 553,555 (Utah App. 1991) (as in "most 
cases," the court disposes of the ineffectiveness claim based on defendant's failure to 
demonstrate the requisite prejudice). 
Further, the trial record must be adequate to allow for a determination on the merits 
of the ineffectiveness claim. "[W]here, on direct appeal, [a] defendant raises a claim that 
trial counsel was ineffective^] . . . defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is 
adequate." Litherland. 2000 UT 76, f 16. "'If an appellant fails to provide an adequate 
record on appeal, this Court must assume the regularity of the proceedings below.'" Id. 
(quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997)) (additional citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "[w]here the record appears inadequate in any 
fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of 
a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id. (noting "[t]his presumption is consistent 
with the fundamental policies dictated by Strickland, see 466 U.S. at 689, [that] 'courts must 
indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance,' and with the general rule that record inadequacies result in an 
assumption of regularity on appeal") (citing Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1226). 
In this case, the premise underlying defendant's claim is flawed. The mere fact that 
counsel made provisions for substitute counsel to appear when he could not, without more, 
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is not per se deficient performance, and defendant does not establish that he was prejudiced 
by substitute counsels' appearance. Defendant's unsubstantiated assertion that substitute 
counsel "knew little about the facts or law" in this case and did not "properly" discuss the 
case with defendant before each hearing does not establish that substitute counsel was 
ineffective. Br. of Aplt. at 7, 9-11. As established infra, the hearings were all designed to 
reschedule various court settings to permit lead counsel to handle the case upon his return. 
Defendant was represented by counsel at all relevant hearings, and substitute counsel was 
prepared to reschedule appearances according to Mr. .Doncouse's calendar. Hence, 
defendant's argument wholly fails to establish that the mere fact that his counsel arranged 
for substitute counsel to appear on his behalf either "fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment" or was prejudicial. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19; see 
also Penman, 964 P.2d at 1162 ("Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a 
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.") (quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 
P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)). 
Further, there is no record support for defendant's allegations of ineffectiveness., and 
defendant fails to allege demonstrable prejudice arising from his counsel's conduct. 
There is no record support for the claim that Mr. Doncouse promised that defendant 
would receive a sentence of probation and drug counseling due to his "stature and ability". 
Br. of Aplt. at 10. To the contrary, at the April 26 sentencing hearing, Mr. Doncouse 
expressly requested "reasonable" jail time "with the opportunity to work" without drawing 
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any comment from defendant (R. 82:4/26/00:7-8). Further, there is no record evidence 
supporting defendant's claim that neither substitute counsel knew of the promise or that 
defendant's entry of his guilty plea was based solely on this promise.3 Br. of Aplt. at 10. 
There is no record support for defendant's claims that neither of his substitute counsel 
knew anything about the facts or relevant law of this case, that neither counsel discussed the 
matters with defendant before each hearing, and that he did not consent to the representation 
of substitute counsel. Id at 7,9-11. In fact, the record reflects that defendant was expressly 
informed of the anticipated presence of substitute counsel prior to the January 10 and June 
28 hearings (R. 39; 83:Tab4:103; 82:4/26/00:2-3,23). Defendant appeared at both hearings 
and made no objection to substitute counsel at either, thereafter "unexpectedly]" registering 
his first and only objection to Mr. Doncouse's representation at the June 28 hearing (id). 
3To the extent defendant's inclusion of the promise "[a]s a further indication of 
total abandonment" by his counsel is actually an attempt to challenge the veracity of his 
guilty pleas, his claim should fail for the additional reasons that he did not raise it below 
and he fails to adequately brief it on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (appellant's 
argument must contain the "contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial 
court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."). 
Defendant cites no authority relating to withdrawal of guilty pleas, instead relating the 
promise to his claim of "abandonment" by his counsel. Br. of Aplt. at 10. Further, he 
failed to seek withdrawal of the pleas below, and does not claim either plain error or 
exceptional circumstances on appeal. Cf State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App. 28, ffl[ 8-27, 996 
P.2d 1065 (reviewing for plain error an unpreserved challenge to entry of a guilty plea), 
cert, granted. 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000): see also State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 
(Utah 1995) (requiring that defendant at least allege plain error to obtain review of an 
unpreserved claim). As defendant does not provide relevant argument or authority, did 
not assert the claim below, and has not presented a plain error argument on appeal, this 
Court should refuse to address the veracity of the pleas. 
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Substitute counsel offered in writing to make himself available to defendant for any 
questions (R. 39), and defendant voiced no concerns or questions about substitute counsel 
or anything else when queried by the court in the various hearings (R. 83:9/6/99/1-2; 
83:Tab2:2-3; 83:Tab4:2-3; 83:Tab5:2-3). Further, defendant fails to identify what matters 
should have been discussed and how the failure to hold such discussions amounted to the 
requisite prejudice under Strickland. Neither does defendant identify the facts or "relevant 
law" substitute counsel did not possess or how such information would have benefitted 
defendant when attending the numerous hearings to reschedule trial to accommodate Mr. 
Doncouse's schedule. 
No record evidence exists to support defendant's claim that his counsel did not 
provide "basic counseling," did not know the facts of the case or the possible defenses, did 
not advise defendant of the relevant law or the State's burden of proof, and did not explain 
to defendant the charges against him. Br. of Aplt. at 9-11. Mr. Doncouse apparently handled 
the plea negotiations, a plea was reached and entered without objection by defendant, and 
Mr. Doncouse handled the initial sentencing stages and reviewed the presentence 
investigation report with defendant (R. 48-49; 83:10/6/99:1; 83:Tab2:2; 83:Tab3:3-6; 
83:Tab4:2-3; 83:Tab5:l; 82:3/1/00:2-9; 82:4/26/00:2-23). Defendant points to nothing in the 
record showing that he did not receive "basic counseling" from Mr. Doncouse in conjunction 
with these events. The record further reflects that at the change of plea hearing, the court 
explained to defendant the charges, his rights, and the State's burden of proof (R. 
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82:3/1/00:4-9). Defendant indicated that he understood the trial court's explanation, 
implying that he had already reviewed the information with counsel or otherwise already 
knew the information (R. 82:3/1/00:3-8). Finally, defendant claims no prejudice arising from 
his counsel's alleged failure to provide this information to defendant. 
Because defendant has failed to provide an adequate record to support his claims, this 
Court must presume the regularity of the proceedings below. Litherland. 2000 UT 76 at ffl[ 
11,17. Additionally, his failure to specifically allege the requisite prejudice arising from his 
counsel's absence defeats his claim. See Huggins, 920 P.2d at 1199; Pascuah 804 P.2d at 
555. 
C The Record Evidence Relating to Defendant's Claim of Counsel's Failure to 
Appear Does Not Support Defendant's Position 
Defendant contends that his counsel, Mr. Doncouse, failed to appear on his behalf at 
more than one hearing throughout the time he was associated with this case. Br. of Aplt. at 
1-2, 7, l l .4 The record reflects the appearance of substitute counsel on behalf of Mr. 
Doncouse at numerous hearings. However, out of the ten hearings which were scheduled to 
4Defendant mentions in passing that there is no written plea agreement. Br. of 
Aplt. at 10. While such a document does not appear in the record, it is not required to 
enter a valid plea. See State v. Vissen 1999 UT App 19, f 15 & n.l, 973 P.2d 998 (noting 
that the trial court has a heightened responsibility to assume the plea is valid where no 
plea affidavit is used), overruled on other grounds. 2000 UT 88, 22 P.3d 1242; State v. 
Mills. 898 P.2d 819, 823-24 (Utah App. 1995) (same); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) 
(noting that requisite findings before accepting plea may be based "on questioning of the 
defendant on the record or, if used, an affidavit....") (emphasis added). 
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occur between the time counsel was hired and the time he withdrew, counsel appeared at 
three hearings, not just one as defendant claims (R. 22-23; 48-49, 50-51; 82:4/26/00:2). 
Further, a review of the ten hearings establishes that defense counsel's absence from 
many of them does not take his performance outside the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Indeed, the record reflects that the only reason there were so many 
hearings at which Mr. Doncouse was absent is because of his unavailability, thereby 
requiring scheduling changes in anticipation of his return (see "Statement of the Case," 
supra). It is apparent that the parties agreed to the continuances in order that Mr. Doncouse 
could give personal attention to the plea negotiations, and there is no evidence that he did not 
do so. Mr. Doncouse presumptively negotiated the agreement because the offer had been 
held open pending his return, he had sought a continuance so that he could discuss the matter 
with defendant, he had been in contact with the prosecutor (R. 83:2/23/00:3), and the record 
reflects no indication that anyone else was involved on defendant's behalf.5 Defendant was 
not incarcerated throughout the time of counsel's absence, so was not adversely affected by 
the delay. 
The record also lays to rest defendant's claim that Mr. Doncouse was unavailable to 
consult with or advise him as to this matter, including throughout plea negotiations. Mr. 
Doncouse had contact with his office while out of town (R. 83:Tab3:l), and his associate, 
5Defendant has not claimed that he was unable to discuss the plea agreement with 
Mr. Doncouse prior to entering the plea, only that he could not discuss it while counsel 
was in Brazil. Br. of Aplt. at 9. 
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Patrick Kelley, invited defendant to contact the office with any questions (R. 38-39). Had 
defendant wished to consult with counsel, his concerns could have been addressed by Mr. 
Kelley or relayed to Mr. Doncouse had defendant requested. However, there is no evidence 
of any question or concern arising. 
Further, Mr. Doncouse was available after his return to the country. The plea offer 
was held open and the case was not advanced during Mr. Doncouse's absence. Any 
consultation could readily have been accomplished upon Mr. Doncouse's return, after which 
he contacted the prosecutor, obtained the plea offer, discussed the plea agreement with 
defendant, and ultimately struck a bargain. Defendant identifies no issue which could not 
have awaited Mr. Doncouse's return from abroad. Consequently, this Court should 
determine that defendant not only had reasonable access to Mr. Doncouse but that Mr. 
Doncouse's availability was not beyond the scope of reasonable professional assistance. 
The underlying theme of defendant's claim is his dissatisfaction with his counsel's 
performance and his sentence. Nowhere is that more apparent than in his repeated claim that 
he did not receive from Mr. Doncouse the "basic presence that the Defendant needed in order 
to feel satisfied" that he had been "adequately represented" (R. 82:6/28/00:2). Br. of Aplt. 
at 6, 10. That dissatisfaction apparently arose when defendant was sent for a 60-day 
diagnostic evaluation at the prison following the April 26 hearing (82:8/2/00:5-11). During 
that evaluation, he was told that there were "inconsistencies" that he would have to have his 
attorney straighten out (R. 2:8/2/00:2-5). Defendant allegedly tried to contact Mr. Doncouse 
15 
without success, and the diagnostic evaluation ultimately reflected that defendant was 
"misrepresenting" and "changing his story" (R. 82:8/2/00:3-4). Only after the evaluation was 
complete did defendant assert any dissatisfaction with Mr. Doncouse's representation (R. 
82:6/28/00:2-3). However, dissatisfaction alone does not support a determination of 
deficient performance or ineffective assistance. Defendant's dissatisfaction with his 
counsel's performance may be disheartening, but it is not the constitutional standard by 
which defense counsel's representation is to be measured. 
As defendant has failed to establish either deficient performance or prejudice from his 
trial counsel's failure to more timely appear on his behalf, his claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's convictions and sentences. 
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not request 
that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / cTay of August, 2000. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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5g-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection QXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(lXaXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined 
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (D(aXiv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
dv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed 
d) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools, 
(n) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti-
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions, 
(in) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4Xa)(i) and (n), 
dv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility, 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center, 
(vi) in a church or synagogue, 
(vn) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto, 
(vin) in a public parking lot or structure, 
dx) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (vni), or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of 
age, regardless of where the act occurs 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years 
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this 
subsection would have been a first degree felony Imposition or execution 
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), 
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more 
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age, nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a) 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
misdemeanor 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research, or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, 6 8; 1972, ch. 22, 
* 1; 1977, ch. 29, ft 6; 1979, ch. 12, * 5; 1986, 
ch. 146, ft 1; 1986, ch. 196, ft 1; 1987, ch 92, 
ft 100; 1987, ch. 190, ft 3; 1988, ch. 96, § 1; 
1989, ch. 50, ft 2; 1989, ch 56, $ 1; 1989, ch. 
178, ft 1; 1989, ch. 187, 5 2; 1989, ch. 201, ft 1; 
1990, ch. 161, ft 1; 1990, ch. 163, ft 2; 1990, 
ch. 163, ft 3; 1991, ch. 80, ft 1; 1991, ch. 198, 
ft 4; 1991, ch. 268, ft 7; 1995, ch. 284, ft 1; 
1996, ch. 1, ft 8; 1997, ch. 64, ft 6; 1998, ch. 
139, ft 1; 1999, ch. 12, ft 1; 1999, ch. 303, ft 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend 
ment, effective May 4, 1998, deleted former 
Subsection (6) which read "Any person who 
attempts or conspires to commit any offense 
unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction 
guilty of one degree less than the maximum 
penalty prescribed for that offense," redesignat 
mg the other subsections accordingly 
The 1999 amendment by ch 12, effective May 
3,1999, substituted "in the immediate presence 
o P for "with" in Subsection (4XaXx) and made 
minor stylistic changes in Subsections (2) and 
(4) 
The 1999 amendment by ch 303, effective 
May 3, 1999, added Subsection (lXc), redesig 
nating former Subsection (lXc) as (lXd), sub-
stituted "chapter" for "subsection" in Subsec-
tion (2XaXi), and made a minor stylistic 
change 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel 
SfrSfd*4' Prohibited acts — Second degree felony. 
/i) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally 
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation, 
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage 
m a clandestine laboratory operation, 
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory 
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation, 
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled 
Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act, 
blowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distrib-
uted or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation, 
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation, 
(0 produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or 
manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized 
under Title 68, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, or 
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the 
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or 
conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person 
regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within 
this state or any other location 
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
Bftory: C. 1963, 58-374-4, enacted by L. (1X0 and (g) and made stylistic changes accord-
« t c k 156,1 4; 1667, eh. 64,1 11. ingly 
Amendment Notes. — TTie 1997 amend- Croee Reference*. — Sentencing for felo-
•eat, effective May 5,1997, added Subsections mes, ft 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301 
M-37d-5. Prohibited acts — First degree felony. 
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(lXa), (b), (e), or (f) is guilty of 
• first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following 
uxhtions occurred in conjunction with that violation: 
(a) possession of a firearm; 
(b) use of a booby trap; 
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dan-
gerous material or while transporting or causing to be transported 
materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was 
created a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the 
environment; 
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place 
*ithin 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school, 
(e) any phase of the clandestine laboratory operation or production or 
manufacture of a controlled or counterfeit substance involved a person less 
than 18 years of age; 
(f) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced anv am,*, 
specified controlled substance, or «*°unt of
 t 
(g) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the produ** 
cocaine base or methamphetamine base ucwon of 
(2) If the tner of fact finds that two or more of the conditions h f^ 
Subsections (lXa) through (g) of this section occurred in conjunction w *u m 
violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony lUi th« 
(a) probation shall not be granted; 
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended 
(c) t h e n n u r t shf l l l n n f o n f o r a i i J i m t A n f G%» a 1/%**,»_ — i. . ' a n d (c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of off' 
Hietory: C. 1963, 66-97(1-6, enacted by L. production or manufacture of a C M M I _. 
ltW, ch. 166,1 5; 1667, ch. 64,1 IS. counterfeit subrfance" in S u b ^ o T ^ * 
Amendment Note* - The 1997 amend- Croee-Refereticee. _ S e n b m ^ J 2 ? 
ment, effective May 5 1997, substituted -(e), or „*., | | 76-3-201 76-3-203 76?ZR ** **> 
(f T for -or (e)" in Subeection (1) and ineerted -or ' •"*-"«. /w-Wd, 76-3-301 
